Kosovo Path a Trap
By Sergei Markedonov The Institute of Political and Military
Russia should propose its own criteria for the recognition of new states
 

Russian:"Путь Косово" ведет в ловушку

The status of Kosovo is in the final stages of resolution. According to U.S. State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack, the U.S. administration supports the efforts of Marti Ahtisaari, special envoy of the UN secretary general, aimed to resolve the status of Kosovo before the end of this year.

The United States and EU countries are categorically opposed to any parallels being drawn between Albanian separatism in Serbia and the struggle for independence by ethnic Ossetians and Abkhaz in Georgia, Armenians in Azerbaijan, or interethnic separatism in Moldova's breakaway Transdnestr region. According to Sean McCormack, every ethno-political conflict in the post-Soviet area has its own unique specifics that must be taken into account.

Nevertheless, "Kosovization" of the post-Soviet area is well under way. The hasty resolution of the "Kosovo problem" highlighted the problem of the self-proclaimed entities in the post-Soviet area.

The Ukrainian blockade of the Transdnestr Moldovan Republic effectively coincided with a massive diplomatic onslaught by official Tbilisi against South Ossetia and the latest escalation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in Abkhazia's Gali District. Lying behind the strong-worded statements by Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian leaders is the thinly veiled intention to resolve the problem of rebellious territories before Kosovo's independence is internationally recognized.

As of now Kosovo will become a crucial factor in the domestic and foreign policy of the "commonwealth of unrecognized states" - a kind of CIS-2 [the Commonwealth of Independent States, the loose alliance that replaced the Soviet Union]. Leaders and ideologues of the Transdnestr Moldovan Republic, Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia keep quoting Vladimir Putin's statement about the need to apply a universal approach to resolving ethno-political problems in the post-Soviet and the post-Yugoslav areas. Vladimir Putin's thesis was unquestionably embraced by the Russian expert community. According to Sergei Karaganov, chairman of the influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, "if Kosovo is recognized as an independent state, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Transdnestr region will have a right to ask for accession to Russia."

At first glance, the principle of universalism is logical. If Kosovo (like Slovenia and Croatia before it) is recognized on the basis of the principle of ethnic self-determination ("blood right"), why are the same rights denied to ethnic Armenians in Nagorny Karabakh or to Ossetians or the Abkhaz?

But the logic of the "universal" approach only goes so far. Kosovo is not simply a model for the formation of a separatist state, but also a certain settlement model adopted by the "powers that be" of this world - Europe and the United States. They predicate the recognition of Kosovo on the return of refugees - Serbs and Gypsies. But is this approach applicable to all CIS-2 states? The Kosovo model could be attractive to South Ossetia since more than 40,000 ethnic Ossetians ended up as refugees in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. In the Transdnestr region, there was no "ethnic cleansing" at all. Yet Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabakh (which so zealously supported the "Kosovo path") will reject this principle. For Abkhazia, the return of Georgian refuges to the republic's entire territory (not just to the Gali District), without any preconditions, would drastically change the ethnic/demographic situation. In that case, the Abkhaz, as before the 1992-93 war, would once again become an ethnic minority. For the Nagorny Karabakh Republic, the repatriation of refugees would mean the elimination of the "security belt" and the appearance of about 500,000 Azerbaijanis on their territory, as well as near their borders.

Russian politicians and diplomats, who are striving to prevent the recognition of Kosovo, should not draw any parallels between the former Yugoslav autonomy and the CIS-2, but invoke such factors as the weakness of the province's state institutions and the threat of international terrorism and drug trafficking (real problems for Kosovo).

By proposing its own criteria for the recognition or non-recognition of newly independent states, Russia could secure freedom to maneuver both in the Balkans and within the CIS-2. Why do we not recognize Kosovo? Because there is no viable democracy there: After all, even the report by Kai Eide, the UN secretary general's envoy to Kosovo, talks about personnel policy based on clan affiliation without any regard to competence. Why does Russia support China (the PRC)? Because there have been several election cycles there and local government institutions are developing.

Why is Russia helping South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Because Tbilisi discriminates against ethnic minorities (not only Abkhaz and Ossetians, but also Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrians) and because it has abolished the Adzhar autonomy.

The mastering of political jargon adopted in the West and a diversified policy would prevent Russia from falling into the trap of "universalism" with regard to ethnic self-determination. It must not be forgotten that recognition of "blood right" as the main motive for revising state borders is fraught with a new "parade of sovereignties" for the Russian Federation - something that the "vertical chain of command" would be powerless to stop.

 http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2006-13-2